The most popular present-day public-key cryptosystems are RSA and ElGamal cryptosystems. Some practical algebraic generalization of the ElGamal cryptosystem is considered-basic modular matrix cryptosystem (BMMC) over the modular matrix ring . An example of computation for an artificially small number n is presented. Some possible attacks on the cryptosystem and mathematical problems, the solution of which are necessary for implementing these attacks, are studied. For a small number n, computational time for compromising some present-day public-key cryptosystems such as RSA, ElGamal, and Rabin, is compared with the corresponding time for the ВММС. Finally, some open mathematical and computational problems are formulated.
Introduction
Security of some present-day public-key cryptosystems is based on computational complexity of some numbertheoretical problems. Two of these problems are used most often: the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem. These problems ensure the security of the RSA and ElGamal cryptosystems, as well as of the corresponding digital signature schemes [1] .
However, the true level of the computational complexity of these problems is unknown. That is to say, they are widely believed to be intractable, although no proof of this fact is known.
In [2] , randomized polynomial-time algorithms for computing discrete logarithms and integer factoring were presented for the quantum computer.
Nevertheless, some alternatives should be proposed. One of possible approaches is to replace number-theoretical cryptosystems by such algebraic cryptosystems that would be resistant to an attack on a quantum computer.
Let us now consider some scheme of cryptosystems, namely, cryptosystems of group rings.
In the author's work [3, 4] , a scheme of group ring cryptosystems was proposed. The idea to apply group rings in cryptography is based on the fact that if we fix the cardinality of a finite ring R, the cardinality of the group ring RG for a finite group G is an exponent of the cardinality of the group G. Then, a legal user can perform cryptographic transformations separately in the ring R and in the group G using polynomial algorithms and the illegal user has to solve computationally difficult problems in the group ring RG.
Let us consider the standardization problem in the group ring and two its aspects. The direct standardization problem is to construct a standard automorphism  of the group ring RG from an automorphism  of the group G and automorphism  of the ring R in the following way:
if an element х of the group ring RG is represented as a formal linear combination of elements i g of the group G with coefficients r i from the ring R, then the image of the element х under the action of  is a formal linear combination of images of the elements g i of the group G under the action of  with coefficients that are images of the coefficients r i under the action of .
The inverse standardization problem is formulated as follows. For a given automorphism  of a group ring RG, find an automorphism  of the group G and an automorphism  of the ring R such that  can be constructed from  and  by the way that was mentioned in the direct automorphism  in the ring R, one can efficiently compute the action of the automorphism  on any element of the group ring RG, i.e., efficiently specify the automorphism  of the ring RG.
As for the inverse standardization problem, there are some reasons to believe that this problem is computationally difficult. However, there is no proof for this statement.
In [5] some generalization of group ring cryptosystem is considered in the case of quasigroup ring.
The question "For which finite commutative rings R and finite groups G all automorphisms of the group ring RG are standard automorphisms?" was partially answered in [6] [7] [8] . It should be noted that an inner automorphism of an integral group ring of a finite group is not a standard automorphism as a rule. This is why, together with the standard automorphisms of the group ring , where G is a finite group, we use inner automorphisms. In [9] the group ring 3 , where 3 is the permutation group for three symbols, is represented in a matrix form as block diagonal matrices of the fourth degree with two one-dimensional blocks and one two-dimensional block. In [9, 10] it is shown that the unit group of the group ring 3 is a semi-direct product of trivial units and a free subgroup of rank 3. Since matrices of the fourth degree from this subgroup contain two identity one-dimensional blocks, we can restrict ourselves by a free group of matrices of the second degree with the free generators [9] : cryptosystems with security level of this cryptosystem for the same small number-in the Section 7, some related open mathematical and computational problemsin the Section 8. It should be noted, that some other theoretical algebraic generalizations of the ElGamal cryptosystem are given in [13, 14] .
S 

Basic Modular Matrix Cryptosystem
(BMMC)
Key Generation
User А does the following: 1) picks large random positive integer n; 2) picks the random words and
in a free rank 3 group with free generators А, В, and С;
3) computes the noncommuting matrices , 
and performing matrix computations modulo n, i.e.,
If n X and U commute, then return to 2);
f n be the cardinality of the group   2 n GL  over n -residue ring modulo n, then user A picks the random integers
, , , , , ,
GL  are equal to n; Remark 2. The cardinality of the group
As consequence in the case are primes, we have
Encryption
User В does the following: 1) writes the plaintext as a sequence of N numbers from n , where N is a multiple of 4, 1 2  , , , N     , adding, if necessary, numbers from the first quadruple by a cyclic permutation at the end of the sequence;
2) writes each quadruple of numbers of the obtained sequence similarly as matrix: 
, , 1, 2, , 4.
Decryption
Using the private key, user А computes for each ciphertext block :
After obtaining the sequence of matrices
the sequence of numbers 1 2 , , , N     and hence the plaintext can be reconstructed uniquely.
Theorem. Decryption in the ВММС is correct. Proof. It is sufficiently to consider a case of one block of the ciphertext:
It should be noted that algorithms of the BMMC are implemented using the algorithm of matrix modular exponentiation similar to the usual modular exponentiation algorithm in which multiplication of integers is replaced by multiplication of matrices with reduction of their elements modulo n. In addition parallel computations may be used in matrix multiplications to increase the computational efficiency of the cryptosystem.
Let n be a large 256 bit integer, then the cardinality bit length of the group would be near 800 bits or more. For comparing in the case of the ElGamal cryptosystem the bit lengths of p and the cardinality of corresponding multiplicative group of residue field
are equal. But one reduction modulo 1024 bit number in the ElGamal cryptosystem costs as some reductions modulo 256 bit number in the BMMC. Therefore, under corresponding choice of parameters the BMMC may be faster than the ElGamal cryptosystem with the same security level, because the gybrid problem and the transformation problem are harder than the discrete logarithm problem in the groups of the same cardinality. 
matrices n and n U X do not commute and, therefore, the user passes to the next step; 4) picks the integers 1, 2; k s     5) the public key is   
2) writes the plaintext as two matrices from   
3) encrypts each block (matrix) separately choosing different session keys. For example, the first block is encrypted as follows; 4 5 7 8 17 15 10 ; here, a number should be added to the last block by shifting the first number cyclically, the user obtains two quadruples of numbers from : 
The ciphertext of the second block is computed similarly with the choice of another session key .
, r t the following: using its private key, for each ith block, computes
User А, having obtained the ciphertext from user В, does in particular, for the first block, he obtains , , n P P 3 ,P 1) Let the cardinality of the group be
Some Attacks on ВММС
n , the cryptanalyst can try to solve the equation with two unknowns Y and х: 
and send the result to cryptanalyst, which computes the plaintext:
Hence for protecting cryptosystem the modification of encryption algorithm is: the modification of decryption algorithm is:
Computational Problems in Ensuring ВММС Security
From the consideration of attacks 4.1-4.4 one can formulate some problems, the solution of which is necessary to implement the corresponding attacks.
The Transformation Problem
Let a matrix 2 be conjugated with an unknown integral power of a matrix 1 for two given matrices 1 2 2 . Find all solutions of the equation with two unknowns Z and у: , p and q are primes. n pq  Let us now turn to the discussion of the cardinality of the set of secret keys for ВMМС. Note that, for classical cryptosystems, the uniqueness of the secret key can be reached by fitting of parameters. For BMMC, the situation is other. Indeed, if a matrix transforms the matrix into the matrix , i.e., 
Comparison of Computational Security of
Classical RSA, ElGamal, and Rabin Cryptosystems with ВММС
